“70,000 feet was supposed to be untouchable.”
Francis Gary Powers lifted off from Peshawar, Pakistan, at 0626 local time on May 1, 1960, in a CIA U-2C reconnaissance aircraft, Bureau Number 56-6693. His mission: overfly Soviet missile and nuclear facilities, photographing sites at Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Plesetsk, and Murmansk. The U-2 cruised at 70,000 feet, beyond the reach of Soviet fighters and—CIA analysts believed—beyond the range of surface-to-air missiles. At 0805, near Sverdlovsk, an SA-2 Guideline missile detonated close enough to down the aircraft. Powers ejected, was captured, and the wreckage, including the camera system, fell into Soviet hands. Nikita Khrushchev announced the shootdown on May 5, torpedoing the Paris Summit that had been scheduled for May 16. President Eisenhower, initially misled by a cover story about a lost NASA weather aircraft, was forced to admit the overflight program on May 11. Powers was tried for espionage, sentenced to ten years, and exchanged in 1962 for Soviet spy Rudolf Abel. The U-2 incident ended the era of invulnerable altitude and forced the CIA toward a new solution: an aircraft that could fly faster than the missiles chasing it.
The U-2's protection rested on one assumption, that Soviet missiles could not reach 70,000 feet. One SA-2 near Sverdlovsk ended that era, a vivid case for building every flight plan with an out in case a key assumption proves wrong.